Is this the endgame for the Maoists?

The recent killing Nambala Kesahava Rao (70) alias Basavaraju alias Ganganna in the Abujhmadh area of Chhattisgarh, has hit the banned CPI(Maoist) very hard. Getting Basavaraju, the general secretary of the party, at his headquarters, especially when he was guarded by his special protection force, which is referred to as Company no. 7, comes as a huge surprise for the left wing extremists.

They are already on the backfoot with the ongoing operations by the security forces at Karregutta in Chhattisgarh, as part of operation Kagar and Black Forest and now the elimination of their top most leader, is the biggest blow that the security forces could give to the LWE, ever since they had launched their offensive.

But would the killing of Basavaraju, be termed as the ‘Endgame’ for the Maoist? Going by their brief six-decade existence, it may not be so.

An activist from Left parties holds a placard with the picture of Nambala Keshava Rao, General secretary of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), during a protest in Hyderabad.
| Photo Credit:
AP

In early 1990s, after the unified Andhra Pradesh government had launched the counter offensive with the formation of the elite anti-Naxal force the Greyhounds, the Maoists then referred to as CPI (ML) PWG (People’s War Group), were reduced to just one single dalam. But they regrouped and bounced back to own up the formation of a ‘liberated zone’ in Chhattisgarh.

But as per security analysts, things in the 1990s were different and now the entire scenario has reversed.

It was the Greyhounds that had pushed the Maoists from Andhra Pradesh to Chhattisgarh and Odisha and then the police force in these states were not equipped to handle the level of guerilla warfare unleashed by the Maoists.

Now, not only Telangana and Andhra have the well trained Greyhounds, who are touted to be one of best in jungle guerilla warfare, all LWE-affected states such as Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and Odisha, have trained special forces to beat the extremists at their own game.

Maharashtra has C-60, Odisha has SOG (Special Operations Group), and Chhattisgarh has the CRPF CoBRA and the DRG (District Reserve Guards).

Now all the forces are not only in possession of superior firepower, they are well trained, we have strengthened our intelligence network, we have high-end technological support and the most importantly we work as a team, which includes intelligence sharing, across the States, said a senior police officer from Andhra Pradesh.

In fact, it was Andhra Pradesh Police that had shared vital information about Basavaraju’s location to the Chhattisgarh police, before the operation.

Reaching the elusive

Basavaraju, has been elusive for the last five decades. He was never arrested since he had joined the active movement. Reaching him was not an easy task, as he was protected by at least a three layer protection ring.

Sources say that apart from intelligence inputs from various sources and AP Police in particular, the members of DRG unit who undertook the operation had played a key role.

Many in the DRG personnel were former surrendered Maoists from that region and they were well aware of the terrain and his hideouts. Moreover, a few months ago, a couple of Maoists from Basavaraju’s close circles, including from Company 7 had surrendered. There is an indication that they could have led the forces, said a senior officer engaged in anti-Maoist operations.

As per sources in the DRG, the operation was meticulously planned over three months with the Narayanpur police and it was on for the last couple of weeks, before zeroing down on him.

On the night of the encounter, both Basavaraju and the DRG personnel unknowingly camped within a radius of 1 to 1.5 km. At dawn, a chance firing took place between Basavaraju’s sentry and a DRG Jawan, which led to the fierce gun battle that lasted for about 30 to 40 minutes and over 300 rounds were fired by both the sides.

The identity of Basavaraju was confirmed by a DRG Jawan, who was a former Maoist and had worked with him.

Where did Maoists go wrong?

Security analysts, who have been closely monitoring the Maoists for decades, opine that the present outfit of the LWE had made a few key mistakes, which is costing them heavily now.

The Maoists basically have two verticals – the political wing and the military wing. Since the formation of CPI (Maoist) in 2004, the focus has been on developing the military wing and the political wing was grossly neglected. This apparently distanced them from the people and a large part of the intelligentsia, who had once supported them ideologically.

Arms and ammunitions of Naxals recovered during an operation that killed 27 Maoists in Narayanpur.
| Photo Credit:
PTI

Mindless killing of innocent tribals branding them as informers did not go well with the sympathising community, rather they had openly objected to it.

There has been ideological clashes between the Central Committee members who wanted both the wings to develop, as it was hampering the recruitment of intellectual and learned young men.

The external support base of the banned party has shrunk so much that even after the killing of their top most leader, the protest has been almost negligible. In a similar scenario, when three top leaders were eliminated by the AP Police on December 2, 1999, in Koyyur forest area of Karimnagar district in now Telangana, the State almost burnt for a few days, with protests erupting across the State.

Documents seized from the earlier encounter sites, clearly indicated that the main reason for the expulsion of Kondapalli Seetharamiah, the founder of PWG, was the ideological clash. He wanted more focus on the political side rather than the military offensive. But the then young guns like Basavaraju and Ganapathi (the predecessor of Basavaraju) wanted to develop militarily.

We had deviated from our core focus area and we are paying the price now, said a former Maoist. Ever since the focus has shifted to military tactics, most of our over ground organisations such as RSU (Radical Students Union) or RCS (Rythu Coolie Sangam), which had played the role of propagating our ideology and as well was our recruitment front, have taken a backseat, he added.

Who after Basavaraju?

Now with Basavaraju gone, the main propagator of military tactics and the Central Committee and Politburo dwindled to single digit from about 30 members, till a few years ago.

Basavaraju’s demise will create a huge void in the military wing, and the remaining CC members are beyond 60 years of age. Two names are making the rounds: Mallojula Venugopal alias Vivek alias Sonu and Malla Raji Reddy alias Sattenna alias Sangram.

Both are said to be moderate in their approach and not expert military strategists like Basavaraju. On the other hand Madvi Hidma the youngest in the CC, is said to be too young, brash and a protege of Basavaraju, who believes in the ideology of military dominance.

The question that looms large, will they be able to re-mobilise the political side, keeping the military flock with them, or as experts suggest that the endgame is on.